Al Qaeda's Final Letter
I posted below about the intercepted letter from Al Qaeda's No. 2, Aymen Al-Zawahiri, to Zarqawi. According to the Gov. the letter has been authenticated. It would be interesting to know how the letter was acquired. Most likely the CIA knew the route the letter would take (either email or by courior) and was waiting for one to be delivered.
The letter is quite fascinating. After reading it you get a few ideas about the relationship between the two terrorists and the current status of both organizations. First, it is apparent from the lett that Zawahiri realizes that he is not in command of Zarqawi, and makes this clear throughout with many deferences. At one point, Zawahiri says that the center of the new caliphate should be "Levant and Egypt":
It has always been my belief that the victory of Islam will never take
place until a Muslim state is established in the manner of the Prophet in the heart of the Islamic world, specifically in the Levant, Egypt, and the neighboring states of the Peninsula and Iraq; however, the center would be in the Levant and Egypt. This is my opinion, which I do not preach as infallibile, but I have reviewed historical events and the behavior of the enemies of Islam themselves, and they did not establish Israel in this triangle surrounded by Egypt and Syria and overlooking the Hijaz except for their own interests.
Levant is essentially Zarqawi's homeland (Jordan). Is Zawahiri sucking up to Zarqawi's tribal loyalties? He also praises Zarqawi for being a better and more important figure than prior islamic heroes:
This is what God Almighty has distinguished you and your brothers with over the mujahedeen before you who fought in the heart of the Islamic world, and in Egypt and Syria to be precise, but this splendor and superiority against the enemies of Islam was not ordained for them.
Also interesting is Zawahiri's clear admittance that the goal of Al Qaeda is the establishment of the caliphate in the middle east. His goal is not necessarily to carry Jihad to the west at the moment. However, he states that attack by the crusader is really the only way to rally the Muslims to this goal:
The Muslim masses-for many reasons...do not rally except against an outside occupying enemy, especially if the enemy is firstly Jewish, and secondly American.This quote coincides with previous statements mad by Khalid, that Osama's main goal behind September 11, was to get the United States to invade Afghanistan (to engage the Muslims). As I said in a post earlier, it would have been much more difficult to fight in Afghanistan than Iraq. Interestingly, Zawahiri has the same dream as all other tin pot dictators have in the middle east - that is to reestablish the caliphate... the arab empire of the 8th century. The most stunning part of the letter is Zawahiri's recognition that Zarqawi is failing in Iraq. First Zawahiri urges Zarqawi that he needs to build public support:
If we are in agreement that the victory of Islam and the establishment of a caliphate in the manner of the Prophet will not be achieved except through jihad
against the apostate rulers and their removal, then this goal will not be accomplished by the mujahed movement while it is cut off from public support, even if the Jihadist movement pursues the method of sudden overthrow. This is because such an overthrow would not take place without some minimum of popular support and some condition of public discontent which offers the mujahed movement what it needs in terms of capabilities in the quickest fashion...In the absence of this popular support, the Islamic mujahed movement would be crushed in the shadows, far from the masses who are distracted or fearful, and the struggle between the Jihadist elite and the arrogant authorities would be confined to prison dungeons far from the public and the light of day.
It appears that the motivation behind the popular support discussion is Zawahiri's recognition that they may not be able to take power once the Americans leave Iraq. He urges Zarqawi to start building this support as soon as possible.
The aftermath of the collapse of American power in Vietnam-and how they ran and left their agents-is noteworthy. Because of that, we must be ready starting now, before events overtake us, and before we are surprised by the conspiracies of the Americans and the United Nations and their plans to fill the void behind them. We must take the initiative and impose a fait accompli upon our enemies, instead of the enemy imposing one on us, wherein our lot would be to merely resist their schemes.
Following this expression, Zawahiri quesitons whether the campaign against the Shia is working:
Indeed, questions will circulate among mujahedeen circles and their opinion makers about the correctness of this conflict with the Shia at this time. Is it something that is unavoidable? Or, is it something can be put off until the force of the mujahed movement in Iraq gets stronger? And if some of the operations were necessary for self-defense, were all of the operations necessary? Or, were there some operations that weren't called for? And is the opening of another front now in addition to the front against the Americans and the government a wise decision? Or, does this conflict with the Shia lift the burden from the Americans by diverting the mujahedeen to the Shia, while the Americans continue to control matters from afar? And if the attacks on Shia leaders were necessary to put a stop to their plans, then why were there attacks on ordinary Shia? Won't this lead to reinforcing false ideas in their minds, even as it is incumbent on us to preach the call of Islam to them and explain and communicate to guide them to the truth? And can the mujahedeen kill all of the Shia in Iraq? Has any Islamic state in history ever tried that? And why kill ordinary Shia considering that they are forgiven because of their ignorance? And what loss will befall us if we did not attack the Shia? And do the brothers forget that we have more than one hundred prisoners - many of whom are from the leadership who are wanted in their countries - in the custody of the Iranians? And even if we attack the Shia out of necessity, then why do you announce this matter and make it public, which compels the Iranians to take counter measures? And do the brothers forget that both we and the Iranians need to refrain from harming each other at this time in which the Americans are targeting us?
Interestingly, Zawahiri preceeds the questioning of the Shia campaign with an explanation as to why the Shia can be left alone even though they are infidels. Zawahiri explains that because the average Sunni does not understand why the Shias are infidels, then it is better politics not to attack them at this time:
People of discernment and knowledge among Muslims know the extent
of danger to Islam of the Twelve'er school of Shiism...We must repeat what we mentioned previously, that the majority of Muslims don't comprehend this and possibly could not even imagine it. For that reason, many of your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering about your attacks on the Shia. The sharpness of this questioning increases when the attacks are on one of their mosques, and it increases more when the attacks are on the mausoleum of Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib, may God honor him. My opinion is that this matter won't be acceptable to the Muslim populace however much you have tried to explain it, and aversion to this will continue.
This is obvious rationalization by Zawahiri as to why the Shia should be left alone for the moment (because the "dumb" Sunnis don't realize the Shia are bad for them). Perhaps Zawahiri (a trained doctor) realizes that Zarqawi is not a mental giant and must therefore provide such rationalizations. Zawahiri clearly expresses his elitism with this statement and that he is not a populist. We are not sure if Zarqawi is a "populist" or whether Zarqawi would take offense to this statement.
I thought one of the strangest points about this letter (other than the request for money) was Zawahiri's listing of the many books and articles he has written, and the many audio statements. It's as if Zawahiri is worried that he no longer carries enough weight with Zarqawi and must remind Zarqawi that he is an "islamic scholar."
It is quite clear that the letter shows that the Al Qeada movement is not going well and that Zawahiri is frustrated with events.
UPDATE: The Wall Street Journal comments on the letter here.
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